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An Addendum in Light of Recent Developments
Bruce Ledewitz*
The author's contribution to this issue of the Duquesne Law
Review was almost finished when In re Bruno was decided on
October 1, 20141 and was entirely finished when the resignation of
Justice Seamus McCaffery was announced on October 27, 2014,
after a very public controversy and suspension by a 4-1 vote on
October 20, 2014.2 But I want to address those two matters briefly
since they will be a part of the legacy of Chief Justice Castille. They
may even overshadow the rest of it.
Bruno appears to be the denouement of an issue that arose al-
most immediately upon adoption of the 1993 constitutional amend-
ment reformulating judicial discipline (Amendment)-how much
authority the Pennsylvania Supreme Court retained over judicial
discipline. The issue arose when, in the fall of 1993, shortly after
the Amendment's adoption, Justice Rolf Larsen was indicted on
criminal charges. The rest of the Justices thereupon relieved Jus-
tice Larsen of his judicial duties, effectively suspending him.3
The reason that this issue should not have arisen is that in con-
text and structure it is clear that the effect of the Amendment, fairly
read, was to deprive the Pennsylvania Supreme Court of any role
in judicial discipline. The context was that the Amendment was
adopted after years of infighting among the Justices and the very
public censure of Justice Larsen by two other Justices-the rest of
the court not participating-that had led to the empanelling of an
investigatory grand jury to look into all the charges and counter-
charges among the Justices. 4 The Amendment was the legislature's
and the public's response to these embarrassing events.
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. Professor Ledewitz contrib-
uted another article to this issue of the Duquesne Law Review, discussing Chief Justice Cas-
tille's contributions to state constitutional law. Bruce Ledewitz, Beyond Edmunds: The State
Constitutional Legacy of Chief Justice Ronald D. Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 371 (2015).
1. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635 (Pa. 2014).
2. In re McCaffery, No. 14-430, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 2762 (Pa. Oct. 20, 2014), vacated, In re
Mcaffery, No. 14-430, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 2807 (Pa. Oct. 27, 2014) (holding the case vacated as
moot on account of Justice McCaffery's retirement).
3. In re Larsen, 812 A.2d 640, 644 (Pa. Spec. Trib. 2002).
4. Id.
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The structure of the Amendment gave the Court of Judicial Dis-
cipline discretion to issue an interim suspension, which was made
expressly unreviewable in any other court, 5 sole discretion over the
choice of sanctions, which could be reviewed on appeal only for le-
gality rather than appropriateness, 6 and the substitution of a Spe-
cial Tribunal rather than the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for ap-
peal of a disciplinary decision involving a Justice.7 To an unbiased
eye, the effort to insulate judicial discipline from the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court is clear beyond doubt.
In the years that followed the suspension of Justice Larsen, and
in particular in the suspension of Justice Joan Orie Melvin by the
Court in 2012,8 also upon the filing of criminal charges against her,
it was not clear how much authority the Supreme Court claimed to
retain in judicial discipline. These suspensions of Justices were en-
tered immediately upon the opening of criminal cases and could
have been viewed as modest exercises of the "general supervisory
and administrative authority" over the judiciary that the court is
granted in article V, section 10(a).9 In other words, these suspen-
sions could have been viewed as temporary actions to give time to
the Judicial Conduct Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline to
decide what to do.
But that interpretation was undermined by Chief Justice Cas-
tille's opinion in Bruno.10 In form, the suspension in Bruno was like
those of Justices Larsen and Orie Melvin, merely a temporary ex-
pedient issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upon the initi-
ation of criminal proceedings against a judge. However, in the case
of Judge of the Magisterial Court, Mark Bruno, a dispute arose be-
tween the original suspension by the Supreme Court, which was
without pay, and the temporary suspension later issued by the
Court of Judicial Discipline, which was not only with pay, but also
ordered that any withheld compensation be repaid to him.12 The
Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts did not recom-
mence paying Judge Bruno his salary in accordance with the order
of the Court of Judicial Discipline and did not order payment until
ordered to do so by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to
5. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(2).
6. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(c)(2).
7. Id.
8. In re Melvin, 57 A.3d 226 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2012) (order suspending Justice Melvin).
9. PA. CONST. art. V., § 10(a).
10. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635 (Pa. 2014).
11. In re Bruno, No. 13-84 (Pa. Feb. 1, 2013) (order suspending Judge Bruno).
12. In re Bruno, 69 A.3d. 780 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2013).
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the court's consideration of its authority to suspend and the author-
ity of the Court of Judicial Discipline to, as the court's opinion put
it, "overturn this Court's prior order."13
Judge Bruno was eventually acquitted on all criminal charges
and returned to the bench. 14 But the issue of the respective author-
ity of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Court of Judicial
Discipline remained to be determined. Chief Justice Castille con-
cluded for the majority that the Supreme Court, pursuant to its "au-
thority at King's Bench" possesses the power to order interim sus-
pensions, including suspensions without pay, and that the Court of
Judicial Discipline possesses its own authority to issue interim sus-
pensions, but that if such orders conflict, as they did in this case,
"the order of the Supreme Court is 'supreme' and controlling."1 5
It is easy to see that this assertion of the King's Bench power,
which the Chief Justice held the 1993 Judicial Discipline Amend-
ment did not displace,16 is in conflict with the terms of article V,
section 18. Section 18(d)(2) renders interim orders of suspension,
with or without pay, unreviewable.1 7 But, in effect, the judgment of
the Court of Judicial Discipline that a suspension without pay was
not warranted was reviewed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
in the sense that its order countermanded that of the Court of Ju-
dicial Discipline and Judge Bruno's salary continued to be withheld.
Nevertheless, the Bruno case presented only a relatively narrow
legal issue: which order of suspension in the case controlled? The
implications of the opinion were far broader, however. By referring
to the supervisory authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
pursuant to the King's Bench power and the authority of the Court
of Judicial Discipline as "distinct" and by raising in a footnote the
possibility that the Supreme Court might even possess the author-
ity to remove a sitting judge,18 the majority opinion seemed to be
suggesting that the Supreme Court might be able to function as a
complete alternative to the Court of Judicial Discipline. That im-
pression was strengthened by the suggestion in another footnote
13. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 642 (Pa. 2014).
14. Id. at 643.
15. Id. at 641.
16. Id. at 675-76.
17. See PA. CONST. art. V., § 18(d)(2) ("An interim order under this paragraph shall not
be considered a final order from which an appeal may be taken").
18. In re Bruno, No. 13-84, 101 A.3d 635, 680 n.24 ("There is no constitutional provision
that places restrictions on the Supreme Court similar to those on the General Assembly re-
specting the ability to restrict a judicial officer's exercise of his or her office by removal, sus-
pension, or otherwise").
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that the Supreme Court might be able to take a case from the pur-
view of the Court of Judicial Discipline under its "extraordinary ju-
risdiction."19
The stage was thus set, intentionally or not,20 for the drama over
the suspension of Justice McCaffery. Prior to that episode, when
the court entered an order of interim suspension of a judge, the
court then left the matter of the ultimate sanction to the judicial
discipline machinery of the Judicial Conduct Board and the Court
of Judicial Discipline, either by implication, as in the suspensions
of Justices Larsen and Orie Melvin, or expressly, as in the suspen-
sion of Judge H. Patrick McFalls.21 Even in Bruno, the contradic-
tory orders of suspension involved only interim suspension rather
than an ultimate sanction for judicial wrongdoing.
But the order of suspension of Justice McCaffery was quite dif-
ferent. First of all, the per curiam order referenced the "Court's
King's Bench power, '22 which prior orders of suspension had not,
and which was reminiscent of the "distinct" authority over the judi-
cial sanctions that Bruno had asserted.23 In a special concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Castille made the reference to Bruno ex-
press.24
Second, while the order did refer the matter to the Judicial Con-
duct Board, it treated the Judicial Conduct Board not as an inde-
pendent investigative body, but as an inferior body subject to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's authority, much as the footnote in
Bruno had anticipated under the court's extraordinary jurisdic-
tion.25 In other words, the Supreme Court stood ready to decide for
19. Id. at 697 n.30 ("The question of whether the Supreme Court may exercise another
facet of King's Bench jurisdiction-extraordinaryjurisdiction-to take cognizance of a matter
pending before the CJD is not before us. We note that, in a case in which the Court exercises
extraordinary jurisdiction over a pending matter, the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction
would preempt proceedings before the CJD ....").
20. Attorney General Kathleen Kane released certain sexually explicit emails to the me-
dia on September 25, 2014, which is the originating issue that led to the suspension of Justice
McCaffery a few weeks later. It is not clear whether the Bruno opinion was, or even could
have been, written with an eye toward the issue of discipline of a sitting Justice that became
an actually pressing issue just a few weeks later. It is worth noting that Justice Todd's con-
currence in Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 701 (Pa. 2014) (Todd, J., concurring), specifically exempted
authority over a Justice from any other exercise of the King's Bench power of supervision
and that she subsequently registered the only dissent from the order suspending Justice
McCaffery. In re McCaffery, No. 14-430, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 2762 at *13-14 (Pa. Oct. 20, 2014)
(Todd, J., dissenting).
21. In re McFalls, 795 A.2d 367 (Pa. 2002).
22. In re McCaffery, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 2762 at *1.
23. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 685.
24. In re McCaffery, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 2762 at *4-5 (Castille, C.J., concurring).
25. The Board was given thirty days to determine whether probable cause existed to file
formal misconduct charges against Justice McCaffery and, if not, to file a report in the Su-
preme Court indicating its reasons. Id. at *3.
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itself what ought to be done in the case of Justice McCaffery's mis-
conduct. 26
The results in Bruno and in the Justice McCaffery suspension
were not just questionable in their own right as a reasonable inter-
pretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution; the public charges that
surrounded the suspension gave further support to the reasons that
the people had attempted in 1993 to remove the Supreme Court
from issues of judicial discipline, particularly when the matter in-
volves a sitting Supreme Court Justice. When the court suspends
a fellow Justice, a mere majority essentially acts against a demo-
cratically elected office holder. There is a reason why a two-thirds
vote is usually required to expel a member of a democratically
elected body.27
In addition, if the entire matter had been turned over to the Ju-
dicial Conduct Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline, either
after an interim suspension or instead of one, there would have
been no need for the Supreme Court to specify all of the charges
pending against Justice McCaffery, including the allegation of
threats by Justice McCaffery against Justice Michael Eakin. 28
None of these allegations had been proven and their listing as if
true was unfair to Justice McCaffery.
Finally, if the role of the Supreme Court in judicial discipline
were eliminated or at least greatly reduced, the people of Pennsyl-
vania could rest assured that matters of judicial discipline were be-
ing handled impartially. Justice McCaffery publically charged that
the allegations against him were part of a "vindictive pattern of at-
tacks" by Chief Justice Castille.29 On his part, Chief Justice Cas-
tille admitted in his concurrence to the order of suspension that "I
have been attempting to remove Justice McCaffery from the
Court."30
In an article praising the legacy of the Chief Justice on the occa-
sion of his retirement, I would have preferred to pass these matters
by. But that would have been impossible. The same admirable
26. The Chief Justice even suggested that the Judicial Conduct Board should only handle
"prosaic complaints about judicial misconduct" and that more serious matters should be han-
dles by the Court itself. Id. at *4-5 (Castille, C.J., concurring).
27. See generally Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 507-512 (1969).
28. See In re McCaffery, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 2762 at *1-3.
29. Kate Giammarise, Pennsylvania Justice Eakin dragged into lewd email scandal; ac-
cuses McCaffery of blackmail, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.post-
gazette.com/news/state/2014/10/17/Another-Pennsylvania-justice-embroiled-in-porn -email-
scandal/stories/201410170187.
30. In re McCaffery, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 2762 at *8 (Castille, C.J., concurring).
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traits of careful judicial craftsmanship, extreme care for the repu-
tation of the courts, and an insistence on judicial independence that
resulted in positive results above, led to the debacle of the
McCaffery suspension and resignation that defined the end of the
Chief Justice's term on the court. I hope that the latter will not
supplant the former. I hope that the Chief Justice will be remem-
bered for his strong leadership and record of accomplishment. But
in every such account, the judicial overreaching in the Bruno and
McCaffery matters will have to be noted as well.
